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Abstract
This study examines the dynamics associated with an economy im-
plementing an Exchange Rate Based Stabilization (ERBS) programs
when they are subject to sudden restrictions in international capital
ﬂows. In the context of a simple theoretical model, we describe the
pressures on a country’s central bank, implementing such a program,
to sell its foreign exchange reserves when the country experiences an
unanticipated shock in the form of an external borrowing constraint.
The theory and the empirical investigation in the paper support
the view that current account deﬁcits coupled with sudden restrictions
on capital ﬂows can account for several of the stylized facts associated
with the ERBS plans. The analysis is particularly successful in ex-
plaining the reserve and real interest rate dynamics observed prior
to the collapse of these plans, a feature which has largely been ig-
nored by the ERBS literature. The paper also captures the more well
documented boom-bust cycles associated with these programs.
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This study examines the dynamics associated with an economy implementing
an Exchange Rate Based Stabilization (ERBS) program when it is subject
to sudden restrictions in international capital ﬂows. In the context of a sim-
ple theoretical model, we describe the pressures on a country’s central bank,
implementing such a program, to sell its foreign exchange reserves when
the country is subject to an unanticipated shock in the form of an exter-
nal borrowing constraint. A theoretical model with restrictions on capital
ﬂows is developed to explain many of the stylized facts associated with these
programs. The model is particularly successful in explaining the dynam-
ics observed towards the end of the program just prior to its collapse. An
empirical investigation in this study supports our theoretical conclusions.
The devaluation of the Mexican peso in 1994 has rekindled interest in the
ERBS programs. These ERBS plans were ﬁrst implemented in the South-
ern Cone countries in the seventies. According to the conventional wisdom,
inﬂation can be reduced at the cost of short-term contraction in economic ac-
tivity. The experience of the Southern Cone countries in the seventies proved
this notion wrong. In spite of a very large real exchange rate appreciation,
economic activity expanded rapidly in the ﬁrst years after stabilization. The
contraction typically associated with inﬂation stabilization came only later
in the programs. Kiguel and Liviatan (1992) and Vegh (1992) have argued
that the outcome observed in the Southern-Cone stabilization is a pattern
common to most stabilization plans, which have relied on exchange rate as
the main nominal anchor.
The stylized facts observed in the Southern Cone countries in the seventies
have been widely documented in the literature. While the literature has
mainly focused on the boom-bust cycle and the associated real exchange
rate dynamics, reserve movements and real interest rate movements have
been largely ignored.
Figure 1 documents movements of exchange rates, foreign exchange re-
serves, domestic credit, real interest rates, and current accounts for selected
economies with ERBS plan before and after recent episodes of exchange rate
collapse. All four episodes of the three countries considered in Figure 1
illustrate cases of chronic current account deﬁcits accompanied by foreign
exchange reserve losses prior to the collapse of the program. We observe
that signiﬁcant loss in the reserves began up to four quarters prior to the
1collapse.1 Domestic credits exhibit fairly stable behavior and real interest
rates have typically risen after the collapse the program.
One of the more popular explanations of the ERBS syndrome was pro-
pounded by Calvo (1986). He argued that the syndrome results from lack of
credibility in government policies caused by chronic failures of stabilization
plans. The credibility problem via intertemporal substitution rationalizes
ERBS syndrome. Calvo’s model, although pioneering in its approach, is un-
able to account for reserve or real interest rate movements unless some form
of price stickiness is introduced.
Atkeson and Rios-Rull (1996) in the analysis of the Mexican stabilization
between 1987-1994 suggest that a slowdown in capital inﬂows coupled with
large current account deﬁcits could account for the reserve losses prior to
the collapse of the program. They develop a model in which they attempt
to capture these features but lead to some counterfactual results. Kumhof
(2000) attributes the reserve losses in Mexico in the year 1994 to portfolio
reallocation from domestic to foreign bonds.
We believe that the reserve losses and real interest rate movements prior
to the collapse of the program could be attributed to trade and current ac-
count deﬁcits being ﬁnanced by reserve losses. We adopt the Calvo (1986)
framework to study an economy implementing an exchange rate based stabi-
lization plan which is subject to unanticipated restrictions in capital inﬂows.2
The central idea behind our explanation of the crisis is best understood
by considering the following balance of payments identity. By abstracting
from errors and omissions:
Net Capital Inﬂows = Current Account Deﬁcits + International Reserves
A sudden stop in capital inﬂows has to be then met by an improvement
in the current account or by loss in reserves. The explanation that we have
of the crisis is as follows. A temporary ERBS program is implemented at
time t = 0, which is to last until time t = T. Agents take advantage of
the lower rates of prevailing inﬂation and increase their spending. This is
ﬁnanced by large external borrowings. The economy accumulates debt by
1Two quarters for Brazil, three quarters for Mexico, and four quarters for Argentina.
2Calvo (1998) has documented that many of the countries implementing these programs
have less than perfect access to international capital markets and have often been subjected
to “sudden stops” in capital ﬂows.
2running current account deﬁcits. At time t = T,w h e r eT<T,t h ee c o n o m y
is subject to another unanticipated shock in the form of restriction on capital
inﬂows and the domestic agents are cut oﬀ from international credit markets.
However, given the fact that the stabilization is still in place, the agents
continue to maintain their high levels of spending. Since capital inﬂows have
now dried up, they ﬁnance the current account deﬁcits by running down the
country’s foreign exchange reserves. The analysis is able to account for the
reserve losses and real interest rate movements prior to the collapse of the
exchange rate regime. It is also able to account for the boom-bust cycle and
the real exchange rate movements that have been typically associated with
these programs. We also examine the consequences of the central bank’s
sterilization policy.
To empirically test the implications of our theoretical model, we focus
on the pattern of persistent reserve losses during the stabilization programs.
We investigate the probability of signiﬁcant and persistent reserve losses prior
to the collapse of stabilization programs based on probit model regressions
against a pooled time-series quarterly data set of 33 developing economies
from 1975 to 2001 and against a data set of ERBS episodes identiﬁed in
Easterly (1996), Hamann (2001), and Calvo and Vegh (1999). The results
of the empirical section clearly suggest that chronic current account deﬁcits
coupled with sudden stops in short-term capital inﬂows could account for the
dynamics of reserve losses during these stabilization plans.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
model. In Section 3, the economy is subject to an unanticipated shock in
the form of a temporary ERBS plan. The rest of the section examines the
dynamics of the economy between time t =0t ot = T. In Section 4, there
is a second unanticipated shock at time t = T in the form of restrictions on
capital ﬂows. The section captures the dynamics that exist in the economy
between t = T to t = T. In this section, we consider two cases (a) When the
central bank follows an aggressive sterilization policy (b) when it does not
sterilize reserve outﬂows. Section 5 presents empirical evidence and Section
6 presents the conclusions.
32M O D E L
2.1 Households
Consider a small open economy which is perfectly integrated with the rest of
the world in both goods and capital markets3. The economy is inhabited by
an inﬁnitely lived representative consumer blessed with perfect foresight. The
representative household’s instantaneous utility depends on the consumption
of both the tradable good, c∗, and the non-tradable good, cN. Lifetime utility








where β ≥ 0 is the rate of time preference. The instantaneous util-
ity function, u(.), is twice-continuously diﬀerentiable (with positive partial
derivatives) and strictly concave.














where σ > 0 is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and z is an index
of total consumption comprising of tradable and non-tradable goods. z is






where γ denotes the share of traded goods consumption in the total con-
sumption.
The private wealth of the representative agent economy in real terms is
given by:
at = mt + qtbt (4)
where at is real ﬁnancial assets, mt is the amount of real balances held by the
consumer, bt denotes net holdings of the internationally traded real bond, and
3The model follows Subramanian (2000).
4qt is the domestic price of real bonds. When there are restrictions in capital
ﬂows, there exists a dual exchange rate system in the economy whereby all
commercial transactions including interest rate payments take place at a
ﬁxed commercial rate E, while ﬁnancial transactions are channeled through
the freely ﬂoating ﬁnancial exchange rate Q. We follow Guidotti and Vegh
(1992) in interpreting q as
Q
E, the ratio of the ﬁnancial exchange rate Q and
the commercial exchange rate E. Note that when there is perfect capital
mobility, q ≡ 1.
The household receives a constant endowment y∗ of the tradable good
and yN of the non-tradable good at every instant. The world price of the
tradable good in terms of the foreign currency is taken as given by the small
open economy and is assumed to be unity. The law of one price is assumed
to hold at every instant of time for the tradable good. The country faces
a constant world real interest rate r.4 The domestic real interest rate (in
terms of traded goods), ρ,m a yd i ﬀer from the world real interest rate due to
imperfect capital mobility and is given by ρ =( r + ˙ q)/q. Let the domestic









Therefore, the ﬂow constraint of the household in terms of the tradable
good is given by:










− itmt + τt (6)
where et is the real exchange rate (i.e., the relative price of traded goods
in terms of the home good), it is the nominal interest rate, the term itmt
reﬂects the opportunity cost of holding money between periods, and τt are
lumpsum transfers from the government.
Consumers must use money to purchase goods. Formally, they face a











4I no r d e rt oe n s u r et h ee x i s t e n c eo fs t e a d ys t a t e ,w ew i l la s s u m et h a tβ = r.
5where α is a positive constant. (7) requires that the stock of real money









(7) holds with equality in equilibrium if the nominal interest rate is positive,
which is the only case being studied in this study. Integrating (6) over time
and imposing the No-Ponzi game condition, we obtain the intertemporal




















Dtdt ≥ 0( 8 )
where a0 is the individual’s initial net asset position.
The consumer’s optimization problem consists of choosing the paths of c∗
and cN so as to maximize lifetime utility, (1), subject to the intertemporal
budget constraint, (8), given the expected paths of y∗, yN, τ, e, D and i.


























where λ is the constant Lagrangian multiplier associated with budget con-
straint (8). (9) indicates that the marginal utility of consumption of traded
goods is proportional to the eﬀective price of consumption, 1+αi.T h ee ﬀec-
tive price of consumption includes the opportunity cost of holding the real
money balances needed to purchase goods. (10) equates the marginal rate of
substitution between traded and non-traded goods to their relative price, e.
2.2 Government
Given a regime of predetermined exchange rates, the government has two
instruments through which it can control monetary policy. It can set the
future path of exchange rates and the path of domestic credit. Since pur-
chasing power parity is also assumed to hold implying P = EP∗,w h e r eP is
the domestic price of the consumption good, E is the nominal exchange rate
deﬁned as units of domestic currency per unit of foreign currency, and P∗ is
6the foreign price level and which is normalized to one, the expected rate of
inﬂation is equal to the rate of devaluation.
The ﬂow constraint of the government is:
˙ ht = rht + ˙ mt + ²tmt − τt (11)
where ht is the government’s stock of net foreign assets and ²t is the instanta-
neous rate of devaluation, ² =
˙ E
E.T h et e r m s˙ mt+²tmt represent the proceeds
from money creation. τt are the transfers issued by the government to the
households in real terms.




where DCt is the level of domestic credit and µt i st h er a t eo fg r o w t ho f
domestic credit.
The domestic credit rule implies a speciﬁc transfer policy. To see this,
ﬁrst notice from the central bank’s balance sheet
Etht + DCt = Mt (13)
Combining (12) with (13) and substituting in the government’s ﬂow con-
straint (11), we obtain:
τt = ²tht + µtdt + rht (14)
where d = DC
E . We are thus abstracting from ﬁscal issues and assuming that
the government returns back to the consumer all it’s revenues. From the
(13), we obtain
˙ ht = ˙ mt − dt (µt − ²t)( 1 5 )
Note that (15) implies that for a given money demand ( ˙ mt = 0), setting
µt 6= ²t would result in a continuous loss or accumulation of international
reserves. We will assume µt = ²t unless otherwise speciﬁed.
72.3 Equilibrium Conditions





Combining the households ﬂow constraint (6) with the government ﬂow con-
straint (11) and imposing equilibrium condition (16), we obtain
˙ ht + qt˙ bt = y
∗ − c
∗ + r(ht + bt)( 1 7 )
(17) captures the dynamics associated with the economy’s current account.
Under perfect capital mobility, we have q ≡ 1; under capital account re-
strictions, we have bt = b. The economy’s resource constraint can then be







texp(−rt)=0 ( 1 8 )
where k0 = b0 + h0 is the initial stock of net foreign assets in the economy.
In a steady state, we have β = r = ρ and λ is constant. In the absence of
unanticipated shocks, for a given path of ² and r, it follows from (9) that c∗
is constant. Integrating the economy’s resource constraint given by (18), we
obtain the steady state value of consumption to be given by
c
∗ = rk0 + y
∗
3 Temporary Stabilization
3.1 The Case Of Perfect Capital Mobility
Under perfect capital mobility, the domestic real interest rate (in terms of
traded goods) equals the world real interest rate (i.e., ρ = r). Since we have
perfect capital mobility, interest parity conditions would imply
it = r + ²t (19)
Using the non-traded goods market clearing condition, cN
t = yN,t h eﬁrst-

















Following Calvo, Reinhart, and Vegh (1995), we now formulate an ex-
pression for c∗














γ +( 1− γ)σ
(23)
Using (22), a closed form solution for c∗




[1 + αit]−e σy
R ∞
0 r[1 + αit]
−e σ exp(−rt)
(24)











(25) deﬁnes permanent income as of time period zero. (24) expresses equilib-
rium consumption in period t as a function of elasticity of substitution σ and
the time path of nominal interest rate. The equation indicates that consump-
tion at time t is proportional to the initial permanent income y.R e i n h a r ta n d
Vegh (1995) interpret this factor of proportionality as the marginal propen-
sity to consume out of initial income. The marginal propensity consists of
the ratio of the average price of consumption over the consumer’s lifetime
to the current eﬀective price. It follows that whenever the current eﬀective
price is below (above) the average eﬀective price, the marginal propensity
to consume is above (below) unity and consumption is higher (lower) than
permanent income. The reason is that consumption is cheaper (more expen-
sive) at that point in time than it will be on average. Therefore, as Reinhart
and Vegh (1995) pointed out, if eﬀective price is expected to increase at a
9future date and remain at that higher level thereafter, the current eﬀective
price during [0,T) will be lower than the average price and the consumption
during [0,T) will be higher than initial permanent income.
We now examine the implications of transitory stabilization experiments.
In this connection, the central insights can be obtained by focusing on the
simple case in which the rate of devaluation is temporarily set at a lower
(constant) level, and is later raised back to its original level.
Formally, time t = 0 is assumed to represent the present. The initial
steady state, that is the state of the economy before t =0 ,c o r r e s p o n d st o




²L if 0 ≤ t<T
²H if t ≥ T. (26)
where T>0a n d²L <² H.
By assuming perfect capital mobility (19), (26) implies that during the
interval [0,T), the domestic interest rate is given by iL which is lower than
iH, the interest rate that prevails after T. This implies that the eﬀective price
of traded good which is the sum of the market price and the opportunity cost
of holding money (which is nothing but the interest rate) is lower during the
period [0,T). It therefore follows from (9), (24), and our earlier discussion
that consumption of tradeables c
∗1
during the period [0,T) will be constant
and greater than the consumption c∗2 for t ≥ T. Given that there is an








0 [1 + αit]
−e σ exp(−rt)
(27)
























10In this case, we will assume that the policymaker sets µt = ²t.A sp o i n t e d
out earlier, if the monetary authority sets µt 6= ²t, t h e nt h i sw o u l dr e s u l ti na
continuous gain or loss in reserves. This would imply from (15) that ˙ ht = ˙ mt.
Since we have perfect capital mobility, we have q ≡ 1. The current account
for the economy during this period can then be written as:




On impact, the consumption of traded goods jumps up causing the trade
balance and the current account to deteriorate. Although the trade balance
remains constant during the transition, the current account widens over time
as net interest income on debt payments increase. To summarize, a tem-
porary stabilization is implemented at time t = 0. This results in agents
increasing their consumption expenditure. The resulting trade and current
account deﬁcits are ﬁnanced by borrowings from abroad. In the absence of
any further shocks, the stabilization episode would end at time t = T with
consumption of tradable goods falling and current account falling to zero.
However, in our case, the economy is subject to another unanticipated shock
at time T<T . The next section analyzes the consequences of this shock.
The dynamics of the economy between time t =0a n dt = T are illustrated
in Figure 2.
4 Economy between time t = T - t = ∞
At time t = T<T, the economy experiences an unanticipated shock in the
form of restrictions on private capital ﬂows. We justify the unanticipated
shock on the basis of recent literature on currency crisis (e.g. Kaminsky,
Reinhart, and Vegh, 2003) which has pointed out that the stoppages in cap-
ital ﬂows have mostly been unanticipated. This section tries to capture the
dynamics that exist in the economy between time t = T and time t = ∞.
We model these restrictions on capital ﬂo w sa sac o m p l e t es h u td o w no ft h e
capital account. This is a simplifying assumption and makes our model an-
alytically tractable.5 Prior to T, the economy was running current account
deﬁcits and hence had accumulated a certain stock of debt. Given our as-
5This assumption is justiﬁed on the grounds that countries have often resorted to capital
controls to prevent ﬂight of capital when confronted with sudden stops in capital inﬂows.
11sumptions at time T , the economy cannot alter this debt. The level of
private debt in the economy is ﬁxed at b. Unlike the case of perfect capital
mobility, the domestic real interest rate (in terms of the traded good) ρ can
diﬀer during transition from the world real interest rate. The domestic real
rate of return is given by ρ=(r+ ˙ q)/q. 6 Both ρ and q will be determined en-
dogenously in this model. We now consider two cases: (a) The policymaker
completely sterilizes reserve outﬂows. (b) The policymaker is passive and
does not sterilize the reserve outﬂows. In both cases, the stabilization is kept
in place until time t = T.7
4.1 Perfect Sterilization




²L T ≤ t<T
²H if t ≥ T. (31)
Given that the economy faces an unanticipated shock in the form of com-
plete shutdown of the capital account at t = T, mt and hence c∗
t become
predetermined variables. Therefore, at time t = T , the consumption of
tradable goods cannot jump and remains at c∗1. From (17), this would imply
that the economy will run current account deﬁcits. These current account
6Formally, the model becomes a dual exchange rate regime with no leakages. See
Obstfeld (1986) and Guidotti and Vegh (1992).
7a. This could be justiﬁed on political economy grounds. As Alfaro (1999) points
out, the real exchange rate appreciation caused by the stabilization could beneﬁtp r o d u c -
ers in the non-tradable sector. This might prompt the government to persist with this
stabilization.
b. We can derive qualitatively similar results in a model where money is held to lower
transactions cost. In this framework, given that the duration of the stabilization is long
enough, a temporary stabilization could actually be welfare enhancing (see Reinhart and
Vegh, 1995). This might prompt the policymaker to persist with the stabilization despite
the unanticipated restrictions on capital ﬂaws. We however choose the cash-in-advance
framework as it is more analytically tractable.
12deﬁcits are ﬁnanced by running down the country’s reserves. The mone-
tary authority keeps the real money balance constant by sterilizing these
reserve losses through increased domestic credit growth (Note that in this
case, µt 6= ²t.).This is possible because of the greater ﬂexibility that the
monetary authority enjoys when the capital account is shut. The reserve
m o v e m e n t si nt h i sc a s ei sg i v e nb y
˙ ht = ˙ mt − dt (µt − ²t)( 3 2 )
At time t = T , the rate of depreciation of the exchange rate is raised back
to ²H. The economy’s resource constraint (18) implies that the consumption
of traded goods falls to c∗2. The domestic credit DC is reduced to support
this lower consumption. Given the cash-in-advance constraint, the path of




c∗1 T ≤ t<T
c∗2 if t ≥ T.
)
(33)
We now determine the path of the real interest rate. Formally, our ﬁrst


















= λT(1 + αi
H
t ) t ≥ T (35)
where
λt = λDt exp(βt) T ≤ t<T (36)
We also know that the dynamic path of λ is given by
˙ λt = λt(β + ²
L − it) T ≤ t<T (37)
λt = λT t ≥ T (38)
Our ﬁrst-order conditions (34) and (35) show that λ will be continuous
and must attain a well deﬁned value at time T.N o t ef r o m( 2 7 )t h a ta ta n
13instant of time before T, λ = ˆ λ.W ea l s ok n o wt h a ta tt i m eT ,t h ee c o n o m y
will be in a steady state with consumption of traded goods given by c∗2.
Since it = β + ²H, (35) would imply λT = ˆ λ. In order to determine the path













T ≤ t<T (39)
Consider the following cases:
Case 1: ˙ λt > 0. Since we know that λ needs to attain the well deﬁned
value ˆ λ at time t = T and that it cannot jump after time t = T,i tm u s tb et h e
case that λ jumps down at the instant t = T.S i n c eλ increases over time, it




=[ 1 + αiT]λT,
where iT and λT are the values of the nominal interest rate and the Lagrange
multiplier that prevail at time t = T. This would then imply that the nominal
interest rate at time t = T, iT < (β+²L). Given that the rate of depreciation
is constant, this would mean that the domestic real interest rate falls at time
T. Therefore, under this scenario, both λ and i would fall at time T.T h i s
would however violate (34).
Case 2: ˙ λt < 0. Once again, λ needs to attain a well deﬁned value ˆ λ at
time t = T. It therefore must be the case that λ jumps up at the instant




=[ 1+αiT]λT.T h i s
would mean that the real interest rate jumps up at time t = T. Therefore,
w ew o u l dg e tt h ec a s et h a tb o t hλ and i would rise at time T.T h i sw o u l d
again violate (34).
Therefore, it must be the case that the paths of λ and i are constant
in the interval [T,T). At time T , the rate of depreciation of the currency
is raised back to ²H. The domestic credit is lowered and consumption of
tradable goods jumps down to c∗2. The economy now runs trade surpluses
and the current account jumps to zero. The paths of the various variables
are shown in Figure 3.
4.2 No Sterilization
The stabilization is in place until t = T . However, under this policy, the




²L T ≤ t<T
²H if t ≥ T. (40)
Once again at time t = T, mt and hence c∗
t become predetermined vari-
ables. The resulting current account deﬁcit is ﬁnanced by reserve losses. In
this case, however, the reserve losses are not sterilized. Domestic credit pol-
icy is set such that µt = ²t.T h i si m p l i e s˙ ht = ˙ mt. After the unanticipated
shock at time t = T , there are no more unanticipated shocks. Since the
economy had accumulated debt in the period [0,T), the intertemporal bud-
g e tc o n s t r a i n t( 1 8 )w o u l di m p l yt h a tt h eﬁnal steady state value of c∗ would
be lower than c∗1. c∗1and mt hence decline smoothly to their new steady state
value. Clearly, the economy runs lower current account deﬁcits in transition
than in the case of complete sterilization. This would imply from (18) and
(35) that the new steady state value of c∗ would be greater than c∗2 and the
new steady state value of λ, which we term as ˜ λ, would be less than ˆ λ.I n
order to determine the path of consumption and real interest rates in this













T ≤ t<T (41)
We now consider the following cases:
Case 1: ˙ λt = 0. This would imply from (41) that r = β.S i n c e˙ λt =0 , we
know that λ needs to jump to its steady state value ˜ λ instantaneously. Given
c∗
t and mt are predetermined variables at time t = T, this would violate (34).
Case 2: ˙ λt > 0. (41) would then imply that iT < (β + ²L). In other
words, the real interest rate falls at t = T. We know that at an instant of
time before t = T, λt = ˆ λt. In the new steady state λt = ˜ λt < ˆ λt. Since there
are no more unanticipated shocks after t = T, λ should converge smoothly
towards new steady state value of ˜ λ. This would however imply that at time
t = T, λ should fall below ˜ λ. Once again, this would violate (34).
Case 3: ˙ λt < 0. Using an analogous argument, we can see that this case
would imply that iT > (β + ²L). In other words, the real interest rate rises
at time t = T. Since (34) has to hold, λ should fall to a value less than ˜ λ at
time t = T. Thus, it must be the case that at time t = T, the real interest
rate should jump up and λ should jump down.
15During the transition, consumption and real money balances fall smoothly
to their new steady state values. (34) would then imply that the real interest
rate rises during the transition. At time t = T when ² jumps up to ²H, the
real interest rate jumps down such that (35) holds at time t = T.
To summarize, in the case where there is no sterilization, consumption
and real money balances decline smoothly to their new steady state value.
At time t = T , the real interest rate jumps up and continues to rise during
the transition. When the depreciation rate is raised to ²H at time t = T ,
the real interest rate falls. The current account makes a smooth transition
to steady state. The paths of the various variables are shown in Figure 4.
5 Empirical Evidence
5.1 Description of Data and Variables
This section attempts to empirically examine the theoretical conclusions de-
rived in the previous sections by focusing on the pattern of reserve losses
under ERBS programs before the crisis. Speciﬁcally, we investigate whether
current account deﬁcits coupled with restrictions on capital inﬂows can ac-
count for reserve movement patterns prior to the collapse of the exchange
rate regime. All data for the variables used in the study are available in
quarterly frequency in International Financial Statistics, IMF. Given this
data set, our goal is to identify ‘tranquil’ periods of ERBS program prior to
its collapse and then to study the dynamics of reserve losses in relations to
other variables. However, as it is not easy to identify all stabilization pro-
grams, we consider the following four alternative samples and check for the
robustness of our ﬁndings in these samples. Among all country data avail-
able from 1975 to 2001, we have taken all non-OECD and non-former East-
ern European country data, since the inﬂation stabilization programs have
mainly occurred in the developing economies and since the former Eastern
European countries usually have had restrictions on capital ﬂows during the
sample period considered. Sample 1 deﬁned as ‘stable exchange rate regime’
is obtained by further limiting the sample to countries and periods where the
rates of change in the exchange rate were less than 5 percent per quarter.8
8Since Frankel and Rose (1996) and Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (1998) use annual ex-
change rate depreciation vis-a-vis the dollar of 25 percent as a basis to identify currency
16This sample will include and cover most of the ‘tranquil’ periods of ERBS
program prior to its collapse. The sample includes a pooled time-series data
of 33 developing economies from 1975 to 2001.9
Sample 2 deﬁned as ‘ﬁxed exchange rate regime’ is obtained by further
limiting the sample to the countries and periods where the rates of change
in the exchange rate were less than 1 percent per quarter. This sample
will capture ‘tranquil’ periods of ERBS programs with ﬁxed exchange rate.
Sample 3 deﬁned as ‘ERBS regime’ is obtained based on the episodes of ERBS
identiﬁed in Easterly (1996), Hamann (2001), and Calvo and Vegh (1999).
Based on the data availability, Sample 3 includes nine ERBS episodes in
ﬁve countries (Argentina, Brazil, Iceland, Israel, and Mexico).10 Sample 4
deﬁned as ‘full sample’ is the sum of Sample 1 and Sample 3.
As the theoretical discussion in the previous section suggests that the
continued current account deﬁcits under ERBS plan may result in persistent
reserve losses prior to the collapse of stable exchange rate regime when there
is an unanticipated exogenous shock limiting the external borrowing capacity,
we examine the probability of signiﬁcant and persistent reserve losses when
an economy experiences chronic current account deﬁcits and a sudden drop
in short-term capital inﬂow.
In order to capture signiﬁcant and persistent losses of foreign exchange
reserves, an indicator function, IRES, is constructed so that the function
takes a value of 1 if country’s reserves denominated in US dollar decline more
than 5% for the current and the next quarter or 10% for the current quarter.
Otherwise, the indicator function is zero. The criterion of 5% decline for two
crisis, we have translated this criterion to quarterly frequency with conservatism to identify
‘tranquil’ periods.
9The country sample is restricted by the availability of the quarterly data for our
variables of interest. The list of 33 developing economies is as follows : Argentina, Ba-
hamas, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Guatemala,
Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Israel, Jordan, Korea, Mexico, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan,
Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines ,S e y c h e l l e s ,S r iL a n k a ,S u d a n ,S u r i n a m e ,
Thailand, Tonga, Vanuatu, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe.
10The episodes included in this study are Argentina during 1979Q4 to 1980Q4, 1986Q2
to 1986Q4, 1992Q1 to 2001Q4, Brazil for 1986Q3, Mexico during 1989Q2 to 1994Q4,
Iceland for 1984Q3, Israel during 1986Q2 to 1986Q4, 1990Q3 to 1991Q1, and 1992Q2 to
1998Q3. Initial three quarters of each of the identiﬁed periods of ERBS episodes described
in Calvo and Vegh (1999) are dropped, since the initial stages of ERBS program may suﬀer
from the lagged carry-over eﬀects from the previous periods of instability.
17consecutive quarters will cover episodes of persistent losses in reserves and the
criterion of 10% decline will capture episodes where the reserve losses occur
in a dramatic way. To check for the robustness of the results under diﬀerent
criteria, following alternative deﬁnitions are used in the sensitivity analysis
as well: IRES2, the function takes a value of 1 if country’s reserves decline
more than 5% for the current and the next quarter, and zero otherwise;
IRES3, the function takes a value of 1 if country’s reserves decline more
than 10% for the current quarter and decline in the next quarter, and zero
otherwise.
To measure the degree of continued current account deﬁcit, we have taken
the average ratio of the current account to GDP of the current and three pre-
vious quarters (CA GDP).11 To proxy for the sudden slowdown of capital
inﬂows potentially reﬂecting introduction of borrowing constraint, an indi-
cator function for a sharp decline in portfolio investment inﬂow (IPORT)i s
constructed so that the function takes a value of 1 if the portfolio investment
inﬂows denominated in US dollar decline more than 60% for the current quar-
ter, and zero otherwise. To additionally consider persistent and signiﬁcant
reduction in short-term capital inﬂows, an alternative deﬁnition, IPORT2,
is also considered in the sensitivity analysis where the function takes a value
of 1 if the portfolio investment inﬂows decline more than 60% for the cur-
rent quarter or 30% for the current and the one previous quarter, and zero
otherwise.12 An interaction term of CA GDP and IPORT (or IPORT2)
with strong negative values may reﬂect a sudden stop in capital ﬂows in a
country experiencing chronic current account deﬁcits.
Other control variables which may inﬂuence the probability of signiﬁ-
cant and persistent reserve losses are considered. Averages ratios of port-
folio investment inﬂows to GDP of four previous quarters (PT GDP)a r e
constructed to see how the degree of exposure to short-term capital inﬂows
aﬀects the probability of reserve losses. The average diﬀerential of domestic
and US interest rates for four previous quarters (DINTR)a r ea l s oc o n s i d -
ered. The interest rate diﬀerential is used to capture the degree of capital
11We have also considered alternative deﬁnitions of the averages of ratios with longer
time length up to 8 quarters. The results are available upon request.
12Our results were also robust to an alternative deﬁnition, IPORT3, where the function
takes a value of 1 when the portfolio investment inﬂows decline more than 80% for the
current quarter or 40% for the current and the one previous quarter, and zero otherwise.
The results are available upon request.
18ﬂow immobility across borders.
5.2 Regression Analysis
This subsection presents empirical evidence on whether current account deﬁcit
and a sudden drop in short-term capital inﬂow increase the probability of sig-
niﬁcant and persistent reserve losses prior to the collapse of ERBS programs
controlling for other variables based on the pooled time-series quarterly data
of the four alternative samples described in the previous subsection. As dis-
cussed in the data subsection, the sample periods are limited to the ‘tranquil’
exchange rate periods in order to examine the dynamics of variables prior to
the potential exchange rate collapse. We estimate probit models using maxi-
mum likelihood estimation with IRES as the dependent variable to examine
the relationships among current account deﬁcits, a sudden drop in short-term
capital inﬂow, and changes in reserves.
The probit regression results with IRES as a dependent variable based on
Sample 1 are presented in Table 1. Models (i) and (ii) indicate that CA GDP
is statistically signiﬁcant in inﬂuencing IRES. The negative slope derivative
estimates are consistent with the implications of our theoretical model where
economies having high current account deﬁcits to GDP ratios are subject to
potential episodes of reserve losses under stable exchange rates. The slope
estimate for IPORT is positive and also signiﬁcant in model (ii). Most im-
portantly, the interaction terms of CA GDP and IPORT in models (iii),
(iv), (v), and (vi) are robustly signiﬁcant and have negative slope estimates.
This ﬁnding suggests that reserve loss is likely when a country experiences a
chronic current account deﬁcit with a sudden drop in the portfolio investment
inﬂows. This supports our theoretical prediction on the pattern of reserve
losses. Inclusions of the interaction term of CA GDP and IPORT in models
(iii) and (iv) result in loss of signiﬁcance for CA GDP and IPORT possi-
bly due to the presence of multicolinearity problem or possibly due to the
fact that the the independent eﬀects of the two variables become insignif-
icant once the interaction term is introduced. In models (iv) - (vi), other
control variables are included to check the robustness of our main results.
Average ratios of portfolio investment to GDP (PT GDP) show strong and
signiﬁcantly negative relation with IRES in models (iv) - (vi), suggesting
that the higher exposure to short-term capital inﬂows in the previous quar-
ters may lower the chances of reserve losses as higher exposure may indicate
19relatively smaller restrictions in the capital market allowing easier access to
foreign capital. The eﬀect of DINTR is found to be signiﬁcant and positive
in model (vi), implying that the diﬀerential in the interest rates will raise the
probability of reserve losses as it reﬂects the degree of capital ﬂow immobility.
Table 2 presents sensitivity analysis based on the model (vi) of Table 1
considering alternative samples and deﬁnitions of variables. The models (i),
(ii), and (iii) show regression results based on Sample 2 (ﬁxed exchange rate
regime), Sample 3 (ERBS regime), and Sample 4 (full sample), respectively.
The interaction terms of CA GDP and IPORT are strongly signiﬁcant and
have negative slope estimates for all models, conﬁrming our main ﬁndings
of the model (vi) in Table 1. The models (iv) and (v) in Table 2 use al-
ternative deﬁnitions of reserve loss indicator functions, IRES2a n dIRES3,
respectively, and the model (vi) uses an alternative deﬁnition of short-term
capital ﬂow decline indicator function, IPORT2, all based on Sample 4. Our
main ﬁnding on the interactive term of CA GDP and IPORT is strongly
supported in these three models. Average ratios of portfolio investment to
GDP (PT GDP) and average interest diﬀerentials (DINTR)h a v en e g a t i v e
and positive signs in all models of Table 2, respectively. PT GDP is sta-
tistically signiﬁcant in all models except for the model (v) and DINTR is
statistically signiﬁcant in all models except for the model (i) and (iv). The
ﬁndings in this section provide empirical evidence supporting our main the-
oretical implication on the pattern of signiﬁcant and persistent reserve losses
during ‘tranquil’ periods of ERBS program given an unanticipated capital
ﬂow shock.
6 Conclusions
The stylized facts observed in the ERBS episodes have been widely docu-
mented in the literature. While the literature has mainly focused on the
boom-bust cycle and the associated real exchange rate dynamics, it has been
largely silent on the real interest rate and reserve movements. In this study,
we seek to provide evidence and account for these additional features.
Atkeson and Rios-Rull (1996) in a study of the ERBS program imple-
mented in Mexico (1987-1994) document large reserve losses prior to the
collapse of the program. They present evidence to suggest that these reserve
losses could be attributed to large trade deﬁcits coupled with borrowing con-
20straints. Kumhof (2000) in his analysis of Mexico in 1994 comes to the
conclusion that the reserve losses could be explained by a portfolio realloca-
tion from domestic to foreign bonds. In this paper, we show that a standard
imperfect credibility model with unanticipated restriction on capital ﬂows
could account for the high current account deﬁcits, reserve losses, and real
interest movements prior to the collapse of the program.
The model and the cases analyzed clearly demonstrate that introduction
of borrowing constraints to the imperfect credibility framework provides a
much richer set of dynamics which are more consistent with a number of
the recent episodes of ERBS. The model is especially eﬀective in capturing
the dynamics typically observed during the latter stages of the program. It
is able to account for reserve and real interest rate dynamics in addition
to the standard boom-bust cycles associated with these plans. Standard
imperfect credibility models in the literature are unable to capture many of
these features unless they introduce sticky prices into their framework.
Furthermore, the empirical evidence based on probit model regressions
supports the implications of our theoretical framework, as the main ﬁndings
robustly show that the chronic current account deﬁcits and a sudden drop in
the portfolio investment inﬂows raise the probability of the signiﬁcant and
persistent reserve losses during the ‘tranquil’ periods of ERBS programs.
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24Figure 1
Source: International Financial Statistics, IMF
Note: Exchange rates, international reserves, domestic credits, and real interest rates are normalized to 1 at the respective initial 
period considered in each figure. The real interest rates are calculated using the current and one period forward index of CPI. The 
four variables follow the left scale. Current accounts are in millions of current US dollars and follow the right scale.
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TEMPORARY STABILIZATION UNDER PERFECT CAPITAL MOBILITY 
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N TABLE 1: Probit Regression on Probability of Significant and Persistent Reserve Losses: Samples under Stable 
Exchange Rate Regime 
D e p e n d e n t   V a r i a b l e :   I R E S                            S a m p l e :   S a m p l e 1   ( s t a b l e   e x c h a n g e   r a t e   r e g i m e )  
 (i)  (ii)  (iii)  (iv)  (v)  (vi)   
Parameter dP/dx  z
  dP/dx z
  dP/dx z
  dP/dx z
  dP/dx z
  dP/dx z
   
Constant  -0.261 -20.761  *** -0.266 -15.665  *** -0.251  -14.489  *** -0.227  -12.017  *** -0.226 -15.034 *** -0.229 -13.387  ***
CA_GDP  -0.950 -4.436  *** -0.579 -1.751  *  -0.155  -0.412   0.095  0.227              
IPORT       0.050  1.645  *  -0.007  -0.159   0.025  0.612              
IPORT*CA_GDP            - 1 . 8 7 3   - 2 . 1 4 3   ** -1.604  -1.797  * -1.861  -2.834  *** -2.042 -2.950  ***
PT_GDP                - 1 . 8 4 3   - 2 . 3 7 8   ** -1.779 -2.336  ** -2.524 -2.670  ***
DINTR                         0.001  2.158  **
                             
Observations  1620     829   827    651    651    588  
No. of positive obs.  345     122   122    87    87   77  
Pseudo R
2  0.012     0.007     0.013    0.024     0.023     0.043     
LR chi-squared 
statistics [p-value] 
20.245 [.000]    5.593 [.061]    10.996 [.012]   15.593  [.004]   15.075  [.001]   25.257  [.000]   
                        
Notes: Probit regression using maximum likelihood estimation. The table reports probit slope derivatives (and associated z-statistics for 
hypothesis of no effect) multiplied by 100. Dependent variable IRES is an indicator function for significant and persistent losses of foreign 
exchange reserves and takes the value 1 if there is a reserve loss at time t, and zero otherwise. CA_GDP is an average ratio of the 
current account to GDP of the current and three previous quarters, IPORT is an indicator function for a sharp decline in portfolio 
investment inflow, PT_GDP is an average ratio of portfolio investment inflow to GDP of four previous quarters, and DINTR is an average 
differential of domestic and US interest rates for four previous quarters. Details of these variables are provided in Section 5. *, **, *** 
represent significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 















Dependent Variable  IRES  IRES  IRES  IRES2  IRES3  IRES   
 (i)  (ii)  (iii)  (iv)  (v)  (vi)   
Parameter dP/dx  z
  dP/dx z
  dP/dx z
  dP/dx z
  dP/dx z
  dP/dx z
   
Constant  -0.200 -9.184 *** -0.208  -5.190 *** -0.238 -13.731 *** -0.160  -15.981  *** -0.169 -15.340  *** -0.238 -13.725 ***
IPORT*CA_GDP  -2.169 -2.377 ** -7.425  -3.711 *** -2.424  -3.539 *** -0.989 -2.285  ** -1.138 -2.825  ***     
IPORT2*CA_GDP                             -2.408  -3.519  ***
PT_GDP  -4.105 -3.162 *** -3.691  -2.118 ** -1.864  -2.127 ** -1.443  -2.143  ** -0.697 -1.228   -1.898  -2.164  **
DINTR  0.001 1.521    0.002  1.946  *  0.001  2.223  ** 0.000  1.047   0.001  3.040  *** 0.001 2.224  **
                                  
Observations  279   85    592   592   592   592   
No. of positive obs.  32    11   79  30  30   79  
Pseudo R
2  0.071     0.281     0.043    0.017     0.038     0.043     
LR chi-squared 
statistics [p-value] 
19.637 [.000]   22.816 [.000]    25.428 [.000]   9.754  [.021]   21.983  [.000]  25.295  [.000]   
                     
Notes: Probit regression using maximum likelihood estimation. The table reports probit slope derivatives (and associated z-statistics for 
hypothesis of no effect) multiplied by 100. Dependent variable IRES, IRES2, and IRES3 are indicator functions for significant and 
persistent losses of foreign exchange reserves and takes the value 1 if there is a reserve loss at time t, and zero otherwise. CA_GDP is 
an average ratio of the current account to GDP of the current and three previous quarters, IPORT and IPORT2 are indicator functions for 
a sharp decline in portfolio investment inflow, PT_GDP is an average ratio of portfolio investment inflow to GDP of four previous quarters, 
and DINTR is an average differential of domestic and US interest rates for four previous quarters. Details of these variables are provided 
in Section 5. *, **, *** represent significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.